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Talent allocation models assume that entrepreneurial talent is selfish and thus 
allocates into unproductive or even destructive activities if these offer the highest 
private returns. This paper experimentally analyzes other-regarding preferences of 
entrepreneurial talent. We find that making a distinction between creative talent and 
business talent explains systematic differences in other-regarding behavior. 
Generally, business talent is less willing, and creative talent more willing, to forego 
private payoffs to avoid losses to others. A moderator analysis reveals that 
uncreative business talent is significantly less other-regarding than creative business 
talent, a finding applicable to both certain and risky payoffs with and without 
negative externalities. The paper makes a contribution to entrepreneurship research 
by qualifying the implications of talent allocation models and discovering the 
importance of distinguishing between the two types of entrepreneurial talent. We 
also add to the field of experimental economics by advancing research on social 
preferences under risk and with negative externalities. 
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, entrepreneurship is thought to have positive effects on economic 
growth and welfare. However, since the early 1990s, several theoretical papers have 
challenged the longstanding notion of the ”productive entrepreneur” and stress the 
importance of building appropriate institutions and incentive schemes to channel 
entrepreneurial activity. For example, in his seminal paper, Baumol (1990) posits that 
entrepreneurship is not necessarily productive; it can be just the opposite and can also 
take unproductive and even destructive forms. He notes that entrepreneurs act in 
ingenious and creative ways to increase their wealth, power, and prestige and not always 
with consideration of the effects their activities have on others and/or the economy as a 
whole.
5 
Essentially, Baumol (1990), Murphy et al. (1991, 1993), Acemoglu (1995), 
Mehlum et al. (2003), and others argue that entrepreneurial talent allocates into activities 
“with the highest private returns, which need not have the highest social returns” 
(Murphy, 1991, p. 506). Most models of talent allocation assume a fixed pool of one-
dimensional entrepreneurial talent that chooses between productive activities (e.g., 
starting firms that innovate and foster growth) and unproductive activities (e.g., by 
redistributing or destroying wealth and reducing growth).
6 This choice is modeled to 
depend entirely on private payoffs. In most talent allocation models, incentive systems 
and institutions determine the private costs and benefits of the different types of activity. 
Consequently, institutions are seen as completely determining the allocation of 
entrepreneurial talent. If they reward unproductive activities more than productive 
activities, entrepreneurial talent chooses the former, despite possible negative 
externalities for others or adverse effects on economic growth.
7 Common to talent 
allocation models, and a central assumption in the literature, is that entrepreneurial talent 
is not other-regarding (i.e., it is selfish). However, whether people engage in productive 
versus unproductive entrepreneurial activity depends not only on incentive systems and 
potential returns, but also on social preferences. 
It has long been held in experimental economics that people do have social 
preferences and that they vary in their degree of other-regarding behavior, variously 
                                                 
5 Here, Baumol (1990) refers to a range of activities that threaten productive entrepreneurship (for related 
work, see Nunn, 2007; Murphy et al., 1991, 1993; Grossman and Kim, 1995). One example is innovation in 
rent-seeking procedures, such as “a previously unused legal gambit that is effective in diverting rents to 
those who are first in exploiting it” (Baumol 1990, p. 897). 
6 Murphy et al. (1993) separate rent-seeking from entrepreneurship by definition. In this paper, we use the 
broader Baumolian (1990) definition of entrepreneurship that includes rent-seeking activities. 
7 Similar models also offer a more general economic explanation for crime (e.g., Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 
1973) and for violent conflicts (so-called predator-prey models by Hirshleifer, 1987; Bates et al., 2002; 
Neary, 1997; Skaperdas, 1992). 3 
 
termed benevolence, altruism, fairness, or inequity aversion.
8 The overwhelming majority 
of these studies focus on certain payoffs. Entrepreneurial decisions, however, also 
involve risk and recently there has been some attempt to investigate the propensity to take 
a risk when this affects others. Brennan et al. (2008) and Güth et al. (2008) provide first 
empirical results on this type of “social risk taking.” Their major finding is that risk to 
others appears much less important than own risk, even for those who are other-
regarding. Güth et al. (2008) explain this result by suggesting a cognitive “crowding out” 
of social preferences by own risk. If people are occupied with consideration of their own 
risky payoffs, they ignore others’ well-being, even though they are other-regarding in 
other situations involving different (i.e., not risky, or not as risky, to themselves) payoffs. 
In a related study, Bolton and Ockenfels (2008) analyze the effect of social comparison 
and relative standing on risk taking. Their results suggest that decision makers tend to be 
more risk averse when their decisions affect others, but less risk averse when the safe 
option implies an unfair outcome; indeed, unfair outcomes seem to be more acceptable 
when they are due to chance. Bradler’s (2009) results corroborate this, but she finds that 
other-regarding concerns are not necessarily “crowded out” by own risk, as people prefer 
fair outcomes even they are costly in the sense of more (or less) risk. In summary, 
experimental evidence shows, in contrast to the assumptions of most talent allocation 
models, that social preferences constitute an important element in human decision 
making, particularly when payoffs are certain, but also under risk. 
Although studies in experimental economics have not yet explicitly linked social 
preferences to entrepreneurial talent, the notion that entrepreneurial talent may be more 
other-regarding than assumed by Baumol (1990) is widely recognized in the 
entrepreneurship literature, particularly in the field of social entrepreneurship. For 
example, Zahra et al. (2009, p.5) define social entrepreneurship as something that 
“encompasses the activities and processes undertaken to discover, define, and exploit 
opportunities in order to enhance social wealth by creating new ventures or managing 
existing organizations in an innovative manner” (emphasis added). Supporting evidence 
for the importance of social motivations is provided, for example, by Bornstein (2004). 
Of course, in the field of social entrepreneurship, social preferences play a dominant role, 
but even in a more general setting, it is prudent to assume that entrepreneurs are at least 
partially other-regarding. Think, for instance, of the innovative and creative “geek” who 
invents and promotes a new solution not only for own profit, but to make a positive 
contribution to the welfare of a country or society at large. Google is well-known 
example of this type of entrepreneurship, which “considers itself a force for good in the 
world, even in defiance of commercial logic. Its founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, 
and Eric Schmidt, its chief executive, have said explicitly and repeatedly that their 
                                                 
8 For studies on benevolence or altruism, see, e.g., Trivers (1971), Brennan (1975), Becker (1976), Bester 
and Güth (1998), and Andreoni and Miller (2002); on fairness or inequity aversion, see, e.g., Bolton (1991), 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). 4 
 
biggest motivation is not to maximize profits but to improve the world.”
9 Google’s 
founders have chosen ‘”Don’t be evil” as their corporate motto. “They have been mocked 
endlessly, and understandably, for their corporate motto …, but probably mean it.”
10 
If, based on both experimental economics as well as on the entrepreneurship 
literature, we accept that other-regarding preferences play a role in human behavior, this 
can have important policy implications. In general, externalities can create market 
failures in allocating entrepreneurial talent. Institutions therefore need to internalize these 
externalities to ensure welfare maximization. If social preferences internalize some of 
these externalities, then less policy intervention will be needed. It is not a given, however, 
that social preferences always improve talent allocation. Evidence shows that community 
standards or fairness can also explain market anomalies with suboptimal resource 
allocations (Kahneman et al., 1986a, 1986b). Within the pool of entrepreneurs, for 
example, it is possible that other-regarding preferences allocate the less talented into 
social entrepreneurship. If social entrepreneurship is considered desirable, it may be 
necessary to design policy so as to improve the quality of this type of entrepreneurship. 
In the more specific context of talent allocation models, social preferences also 
have policy intervention implications. For example, if entrepreneurial talent is more 
other-regarding than non-entrepreneurs, the allocative function of formal institutions risks 
being too restrictive and might even hinder selection of appropriate individuals into 
productive ventures. If, on the other hand, entrepreneurial talent is negatively correlated 
with other-regarding preferences, strong formal institutions will be needed to internalize 
these negative externalities. 
The experimental evidence presented in this paper challenges the key assumption 
that entrepreneurial talent is selfish. Our results stress the importance of distinguishing 
between different types of entrepreneurial talent, as well as considering the possibility 
that people do care about inflicting damage on others, even when this damage is not 
certain. In our experiment, we find that entrepreneurial talent consists of two 
components: creation (creative talent) and exploitation (business talent). More 
importantly, however, we find that along these dimensions of entrepreneurial talent 
people systematically differ in their willingness to forego private payoffs to avoid loss to 
others. The business-oriented component of entrepreneurial talent is more, whereas the 
creative component is less, likely to risk collateral damage by engaging in privately 
profitable unproductive or even destructive activities. These findings and considerations 
do not change the general conclusion that formal institutions and incentive schemes 
matter in the allocation of entrepreneurial talent, but they do shed more light on how 
exactly institutions and incentives function and how they could be improved. 
                                                 
9 The Economist, August 30, 2007a: ”Inside the Googleplex.” For a similar quote, see The Economist, 
August 30, 2007b: “Who’s afraid of Google?” 
10 The Economist, December 04, 2008: “Enlightenment man.” 5 
 
In this paper, we contribute to the entrepreneurship literature by providing a first 
experimental analysis linking other-regarding preferences to entrepreneurial talent and by 
showing the importance of distinguishing between the creative and the business 
dimensions of that talent. In testing the key assumption of selfish preferences in talent 
allocation models, we also provide an empirical investigation of the general validity of 
these models. Furthermore, this paper contributes to the experimental economics 
literature by studying social preferences and social risk taking with respect to negative 
externalities, that is, in contrast to most literature in this field, we analyze willingness to 
risk collateral damage. This is an important contribution because previous work, which 
mostly does not deal with negative externalities, cannot be generalized to such without a 
great deal of caution. There are several reasons for this. First, attitudes to risks borne by 
others have not yet been introduced into economic theory.
11 Second, there is ample 
evidence from descriptive decision theory that risk propensity differs with respect to 
gains and losses (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). As most models of talent 
allocation include risky payoffs with losses for others, there is thus a need for an 
experimental analysis of social risk taking with negative externalities, which, to the best 
of our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide. 
In Section 2, the different decision tasks (treatments) and the experimental 
procedures are described in detail. The results of the experiment are reported in Section 3. 
Section 4 concludes. 
2. The experiment 
2.1 Decision tasks 
To elicit other-regarding behavior, we rely on six decision tasks (treatments), all 
based on the dictator game. In fact, Treatment 1 (the base case), is the classic dictator 
game, where a dictator   receives an amount of money   and then decides on the size of 
a donation      to the receiver  . In our experiment,   is 10 Euro. The payoff of the 
dictator,   , and for the receiver,    , are defined as follows:
12 
        ,   w i t h   0      
        
Treatment 1 elicits other-regarding preferences in sure payoffs. Most models of 
unproductive entrepreneurship, however, involve decisions under risk and distributing 
sure positive payoffs might involve different behavior than distributing chances for 
receiving a positive payoff. We therefore modify the classic dictator game to include 
risky payoffs. Following Karni et al. (2008) and Krawczyk and Lec (2008), we let the 
                                                 
11 In fact, none of the existing theoretical frameworks, neither models of decision making under risk nor 
models of social preferences, can explain how social preferences of individuals affect decision making 
under risk (Brennan et al., 2008; Bradler, 2009). 
12 For simplicity, we define the payoffs of all decision tasks as expected monetary payoffs. 6 
 
dictator decide on how to divide 100 lottery tickets, each of which wins   if drawn. Both 
the dictator and the receiver have a lottery wheel with 100 lottery tickets out of which one 
ticket will be drawn. The dictator’s lottery wheel contains 100 winning tickets each worth 
a prize   if drawn; the receiver’s lottery wheel contains 100 blanks, each worth zero. The 
dictator can decide how many of her winning tickets she wants to exchange for blanks of 
the receiver. This allows a dictator who cares about others to give the receiver a chance to 
win, too. As shown in the following payoff functions of Treatment 2, the expected payoff 
for the dictator is thus the probability   of winning the amount  , whereas the expected 
profit for the receiver is based on the complementary probability: 
     ·   
       1     ·  
Because risk propensity varies with respect to gains and losses (e.g., Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992), we replicate Treatment 2 with a negative prize  . This generates the 
following expected payoffs for Treatment 3: 
        ·    
          1     ·    
To include negative externalities, we combine the dictator’s payoffs in Treatments 
2 and 3. In Treatment 4, the dictator does not split the pie of (risky) gains or losses; 
instead, any increase in the probability of winning   is accompanied by an equally 
strong increase in the risk of collateral damage (loss for the receiver). In this treatment, 
both the dictator’s and the receiver’s lottery wheels each contain 100 blanks. The dictator 
additionally receives 100 winning tickets each worth  , which can be used to convert 
(draw and replace) blanks in her own lottery. However, every time the dictator converts 
one of her blanks into a winning ticket, a blank in the receiver’s lottery is converted into a 
ticket “winning” a negative amount,   . 
     ·   
         ·    
In a modification of Treatment 4, the dictator is able to recover some or all of the 
negative externalities inflicted on the receiver. In Treatment 5, the chances that the 
dictator forgoes winning  , i.e.,  1    , are used to reduce the risk of collateral damage, 
i.e.,    ·   . In this treatment, all unused conversions of blanks into winners in the 
dictator’s lottery automatically convert “negative tickets” in the receiver’s lottery back 
into blanks. The dictator is thus able to “neutralize” negative externalities to a sure payoff 
of zero for the receiver. 
     ·   
      
      1     ·         0 . 5
0        0.5
 7 
 
In Treatment 5, any decision on   0 . 5  is wasteful. In Treatment 6, we remove 
this restriction, so that the dictator can now share positive expected gains by choosing 
  0 . 5 . That is, once all negative externalities have been neutralized in the receiver’s 
lottery, all of the dictator’s remaining unused conversions (up to 100) replace blanks in 
the receiver’s lottery with “positive tickets,” each worth   if drawn. The payoffs in 
Treatment 6 are as follows: 
     ·   
             1     ·    
Thus, in Treatment 6, the dictator can either maximize private revenues by 
choosing   1 , partially or fully neutralize negative externalities by choosing 0.5   
  1 , or share positive expected gains by choosing   0 . 5 . 
2.2 Participants 
Based on the theoretical literature, a pool of entrepreneurially talented people will 
self-select into a diverse set of available activities. We therefore conducted our 
experiments with a diverse group of students for whom it is a priori unclear what 
activities those among them with entrepreneurial talent will select. Despite the potential 
benefits of focusing on selected professionals for experiments (Alevy et al., 2007; 
Drehmann et al., 2005; Elston, 2006), there are at least three reasons why established 
entrepreneurs are not a suitable population for our experiment. First, established 
entrepreneurs have already made their occupational choice and would therefore bias our 
sample on one of the possible outcomes of entrepreneurial talent. Second, an experiment 
with current entrepreneurs would suffer from a survival bias, as survival depends on 
many things apart from individual talent. Third, it is not the real talent, but the 
subjectively perceived talent that determines the a priori choice and initial allocation in 
which are interested. We therefore classify participants according to their subjective 
perception of their talent to perform activities required to become and be an entrepreneur, 
i.e., their entrepreneurial self-efficacy. 
Three experimental sessions were conducted at the experimental laboratory ELSE 
at Utrecht University, the Netherlands, in February 2009. Participants were taken from a 
subject pool of approximately 1,400 registered students of the Utrecht University, which 
included students all faculties, enrolled in both bachelor and masters programs. Another 
three sessions were conducted in March 2009 at the experimental laboratory of the Max 
Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany. There, participants came from a pool of 
approximately 2,000 registered students of universities located in Jena who were enrolled 
in bachelor and master-level programs. In both settings, we recruited students from all 
disciplines, ranging from the natural to the social sciences, with the exception of 
psychology, students of which were excluded due to their possible previous experience 
with experiments not following the experimental economics paradigm, which could make 8 
 
biased and/or distrustful. Altogether 132 subjects participated, 60 in Utrecht and 72 in 
Jena. There were 79 male and 53 female participants, with an average age of 22.6 (and a 
standard deviation of 2.95). Of the 60 dictators (who knew their role in advance), 40 were 
male and 20 female, with an average age of 22.9 (and a standard deviation of 3.08). 
2.3 Procedures 
Subjects were randomly assigned to pairs and informed of their role in this pair, 
i.e., receiver or dictator. At no point during the experiment were the students told who the 
other half of their pair was.
13 Participants remained in the same pair and played the same 
role throughout the entire session. The experiment consisted of two sets of treatments. 
Within each set, presentation of treatments was randomized. In the first set, participants 
were confronted with the treatments explained in Section 2.1 and in Appendix B. In this 
set, a few additional treatments (two in Utrecht and three in Jena) of the dictator game 
with sure outcomes were included. Subsequently, an additional set of 13 treatments, 
closely related to Brennan et al. (2008) and Güth et al. (2008), was played. These 
treatments and the additional treatments in the first set are reported and analyzed 
elsewhere. 
Similar to Ben-Ner et al. (2004), who investigate the extent to which personality 
can affect behavior in dictator games, we included psychometric measurements, 
especially those related to entrepreneurial self-efficacy, the general “Big Five” 
personality traits, and some specific measurements on social dominance and 
responsibility. As described below, these data were used to identify entrepreneurial talent 
and to run robustness checks where we control for general personality traits. 
Additionally, each subject answered a few short questions on personal, demographic data. 
Both sets of three sessions each followed the same procedure and the sessions 
were computerized using a program written with z-tree (Fischbacher, 1999). Participants 
were seated in a random order at PCs, separated from each other by screens. Instructions 
were distributed before each part of the experiment and questions were answered in 
private.
14 All treatments contained a “preview” function, such that participants could 
proceed only if they pushed the preview button, which resulted in a display of 
consequences for the dictator as well as for the receiver (see Appendix C). They could 
push the preview button as often as they wanted, enabling them to better understand the 
effects of their decisions on the final outcomes. Before starting the experiment, subjects 
were informed that would receive a 12.50 Euro show-up fee (payable after the 
experiment); this ensured that no one went home with less money than they arrived with. 
                                                 
13 In Utrecht, the receivers were asked to answer the same question as the dictators but from a hypothetical 
perspective. In the Jena sessions, 10 dictators were complemented by 14 other players, who were told that 
they were paired and in one out of seven cases they were the dictator in their pair. Their actual role was 
revealed at the end of the experiment. In this paper, however, we only focus on the responses of dictators 
who knew in advance that they were dictators. 
14 Upon request, the instructions are available from the corresponding author. 9 
 
Earnings in the experiment were determined by one individually and randomly selected 
treatment per pair. This led to an average payoff of about 15 Euro per subject, but with 
substantial variance between 2.5 and 27.5 Euro. The duration of the experiment was 
about 90 minutes. 
2.4 Psychometric measurements 
Entrepreneurial self-efficacy has been measured at different levels of relatedness 
to entrepreneurship: Wilson et al. (2007) at a more general level, Zhao et al. (2005) at a 
more specific level.
15 We utilize Wilson et al. (six items), extend it with items from Zhao 
et al. (2005), and add two items at the specific level suggested by Erik Monsen in a 
personal communication (see Appendix A).
16 To validate the internal structure, we run a 
common factor analysis. The common factor analysis yields three factors with 
eigenvalues above 1; the third just marginally exceeds 1. The three factors relate to 
creativity, to general self-efficacy, mainly based on Wilson’s items, and more specific 
self-efficacy based on the Zhao and Monsen items. When factorizing without the 
creativity items, there is only one factor with an eigenvalue exceeding 1. Also Velicer’s 
(1976) Minimum Average Partial (MAP) test, which is less susceptible to overestimating 
the number of factors, suggests only two factors. We therefore separate the creativity 
items from the rest of the items to form the creativity factor C (two items, α = 0.76), 
while the other items form the (entrepreneurial) business talent factor BT (10 items, α = 
0.79).
17 
In addition to entrepreneurial self-efficacy, we administered the Social 
Dominance Scale (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), which involves preference for hierarchy, 
discrimination, and domination within any given social system, and the Social 
Responsibility Scale (Berkowitz and Lutterman, 1968); both scales are considered to 
elicit behavior toward others as well as social preferences. The social responsibility items 
form a one-dimensional scale (a common factor analysis results in a single factor with an 
eigenvalue above 1) and the internal reliability measured by Cronbach’s alpha is 0.55. A 
factor common analysis for social dominance yields two factors with eigenvalues above 
1, one factor for positively and one for negatively framed items. According to Spector et 
al. (1997), this may well represent an artificial factor structure and we thus consider it, 
too, as one-dimensional. The corresponding Cronbach’s alpha is 0.91. 
                                                 
15 Chen et al. (1998) measure entrepreneurial self-efficacy at a very specific level, including, for example, 
the perceived ability to set and meet market-share goals. However, this scale was specifically designed to 
distinguish entrepreneurial from managerial self-efficacy, but not from other backgrounds. Analogous to 
our argument for excluding real entrepreneurs, we therefore consider this scale inappropriate for our 
purposes. 
16 As a robustness check, we also tested the scales without the two items suggested by Erik Monsen. The 
results were qualitatively unchanged from those reported here. 
17 This factor includes one item with weak loadings, i.e., the ability to manage money. 10 
 
We also integrated a 10-item short version of the “Big Five” personality traits, 
which describe five broad psychological factors or dimensions of personality. These 
factors have been found not only to be related to entrepreneurship (Zhao et al., 
forthcoming), but also to explain behavior in dictator games (Ben-Ner et al., 2004). The 
scale developed by Rammstedt and John (2007) includes two items for each of the 
following dimensions: extraversion (larger score reflects more outgoing and sociable 
personality), agreeableness (larger score reflects more trusting and less suspicion toward 
others), conscientiousness (larger score reflects more self-discipline, duty consciousness, 
and achievement orientation), neuroticism, sometimes called emotional stability (larger 
score reflects a personality that is emotionally reactive and vulnerable to stress), and 
openness (larger score reflects an imaginative rather than a down-to-earth, conventional 
personality). A common factor analysis extracting five factors based on an oblique 
rotation leads to the expected loadings above 0.4 on their corresponding factors, but 
below 0.22 on other factors. Due to the extreme shortness (two items), reliability 
coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) vary substantially and are on average rather low, 0.73, 
0.39, 0.46, 0.67, and 0.39. Only extraversion and neuroticism show acceptable levels of 
internal reliability. We nevertheless keep all variables in the analysis but treat the results 
with caution. 
3. Experimental results 
In the following analysis, we focus on a subset of responses, i.e., on the 60 
dictators who knew in advance that they were dictators. The different versions of the 
dictator game that we employ are difficult to compare as they require participants to 
respond in different ways, e.g., give away sure Euro amounts or convert lottery tickets. 
However, all versions of the game share the characteristic that the dictator can give 
negatively valued objects away, take positively valued objects from the other, or generate 
positively valued objects for her own or the other’s benefit. The effect on the partner is 
completely determined once the dictator makes a choice. Furthermore, the two extreme 
responses are the same in all treatments; either the dictator receives nothing or gives 
away everything with certainty, or the dictator receives 10 Euro or does not lose 10 Euro 
with certainty. The treatments only differ with respect to interior results. Regardless of 
the game’s structure, the dictator can continuously vary her own expected payoff between 
0 and 10 Euro or between –10 and 0 Euro. To simplify analysis and reporting of results, 
we transform all responses such that they are normalized between 0 and 10 and describe 
the amounts as the “good thing” the dictator keeps, takes, or generates for herself. Thus, 
not losing is considered a “good thing”; we refer to this as keeping. We further calculate 
a combined response by standardizing (calculating the z-scores for) each treatment and 
calculating the sum over all treatments. This cumulated response does not describe the 
average keeping, but it describes the overall relative deviation from the population mean 11 
 
and therefore describes how much a participant deviates on average from the mean. The 




Table 1 reports correlations of psychometric variables and combined response. 
Within the set of dictators, both creativity and business talent are virtually independent (ρ 
= –0.01 with p = 0.96; see Figure 1). Creativity, as well as business talent, correlate with 
extraversion, but creativity correlates positively with openness and business talent 
correlates negatively with neuroticism. Note further that the cumulated response 
correlates negatively with creativity and positively with business talent. Similarly, 
neuroticism is negatively correlated with the cumulated response, but extraversion and 




For responses to all treatments, as well as for the combined response, Table 2 
reports the means, standard deviation, median, and nonparametric correlation tests 
(Spearman and Kendall’s tau) of keeping with business talent and creativity. Although 
the correlations are not always significant, the overall pattern suggests that business talent 
is positively correlated with keeping more for oneself, whereas creativity seems to be 
negatively correlated in this regard. However, correlation analysis cannot reveal whether 





We split the sample into four roughly equal-sized subgroups (via median splits 
along the two dimensions, creativity and business talent): BT+/C+, BT+/C–, BT–/C+, 
and BT–/C–. When plotting the average response for each of the four groups (see Figure 





To investigate whether this visual result is statistically valid, we test the following 
conditions nonparametrically: (1) BT+/C– is larger than the remaining three groups, (2) 12 
 
the remaining three groups are alike, (3) BT+/C– differs from each of the remaining three 
groups, and (4) all four groups together are not alike (see Table 3). Results reveal that 
these conditions almost always hold true; there are just two exceptions. In Treatment 8, 
BT+/C– does not differ significantly from BT–/C–; in Treatment 5, the test as to whether 
all four subgroups are from the same population is not significant. However, all signs of 
binary comparisons are as predicted. There is a small tendency for the creative but not 
business talented, i.e., BT–/C+, to be more similar to the business talented but uncreative, 
i.e., BT+/C–, than to the other two subgroups. We therefore tested whether this group 
differs from the other two subgroups within these three remaining subgroups; we find no 
significance at all. The overall evidence therefore suggests that the general pattern shown 
in Figure 2 holds across all treatments (see Figure 3 for treatment-specific plots 




The nonparametric tests conducted to this point were based on an artificial 
dichotomization at the median, which is appropriate because in many treatments the 
responses are bimodal. However, by dichotomization we lose information. To analyze the 
dependencies in more detail we also employ an ordered probit regression analysis. We 
selected the ordered probit because people might anchor on specific points for their 
decisions instead of considering the whole spectrum of possible responses. They might, 
for instance, focus on values that can be divided by 10. We report robust standard errors 
based on seemingly unrelated estimations (Weesie, 1999). The model for the combined 
response is estimated independently. As control variables we include age, gender, and the 
city where the data were collected. Table 4 summarizes the regression results. Note that 
our conclusions do not change if we employ an ordinary least square regression 




Table 4 shows that participants in Jena tend to keep more for themselves, that 
creative people tend to keep less and business-talented participants tend to keep more, 
and that there is a negative interaction between both effects, such that those who are 
creative and business talented do not keep as much for themselves as those who are not 
creative but still business talented. Results from the nonparametric analyses are therefore 
confirmed based on parametric regression controlling for some basic demographic 
variables. 
Although the distinct behavior of the uncreative but business-talented people is 
more or less robust across the different treatments, one could suspect that participants’ 13 
 
behaviors are basically the same across all treatment and that they simply did not care 
about variations in the different treatments. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients 
between responses are between 0.69 and 0.87, indicating a rather close relation between 
responses to different treatments, but a median comparison based on the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test indicates that the absolute levels of responses vary significantly between 
treatments. For instance, in T4, where a dictator cannot neutralize losses caused to the 
receiver, participants keep significantly less for themselves compared to T6 and T7, 
where they can neutralize such losses (p < 0.05). In fact, out of 15 binary comparisons, 
eight differences are significant at the 0.5% level, three at the 5% level, and four are 
insignificant (T5 vs. T6, T1 vs. T5 and T6, and T2 vs. T3). The latter clearly form groups 
of treatments: T5 and T6 are treatments where the receiver’s losses can be neutralized 
and T2 and T3 are treatments that do not mix gains and losses. These level differences 
between treatments allow us to conclude that treatments do indeed make a difference 
(manipulation check). Additionally, that we observed the same pattern for uncreative but 
business-talented people across all treatments is strong support that this particular finding 
is robust. 
To more technically test the robustness of our results, we include additional 
variables such as social dominance, social responsibility, and the “Big Five” personality 
traits. We run this analysis for the combined response only (see Table 5). Model VIII in 
Table 5 reports a regression without our model variables. Social dominance is not 
significant, but social responsibility and neuroticism are. The relation between social 
responsibility and behavior in dictator games is obvious; the relation between neuroticism 
and dictator games is less so. When including our model variables and the Big Five 
personality traits (Model V), we observe that the coefficient of openness changes 
substantially, which indicates a potential multicollinearity problem. Indeed, openness and 
creativity are substantially correlated (r = 0.65; see Table 1). The coefficient of business 
talent also changes by approximately 20 percent, which is not surprising as neuroticism 
and business talent are correlated, too. When excluding the corresponding dimension of 
the Big Five, creativity (Model VI) and business talent (Model VII) become significant 
(see Models VI and VII). Note that independent of these multicollinearity issues, for all 
models the interaction between creativity and business talent remains significant, again 





4. Discussion and conclusions 
4.1 Summary 
This study sought an answer to the question of whether the entrepreneurially 
talented care about other people or, instead, act to maximize their own payoffs. More 
specifically, we were interested in whether entrepreneurial talent selects into actions that 
hurt other people. We find that social preferences and avoiding negative externalities on 
others are systematically related to entrepreneurial talent. Interestingly, however, this 
finding is not uniform across the two types of talent considered essential to 
entrepreneurship, i.e., creativity and the ability to start and run a business. These two 
dimensions reveal an interesting interplay. One group of participants, those who consider 
themselves to have business talent but not be especially creative, stands out from the rest: 
this group keeps comparatively more and cares comparatively less about others. While 
this seems to support Baumol’s (1990) assumption as to the profit-maximizing behavior 
of entrepreneurial talent, that assumption does not hold true for creative people. The 
group of creative people who also have business talent does not care less but, instead, 
cares significantly more about others than do those who are uncreative but talented in 
business. 
4.2 Limitations 
Our study is not without limitations. We used tested and published psychometric 
scales to measure entrepreneurial self-efficacy. In validating them, however, we found 
that they represent two distinct factors, creativity and business talent, which factors were 
then used in our further analysis. There are many studies on entrepreneurial self-efficacy, 
but we could find only a single study arguing that creativity needs to be psychometrically 
distinguished from entrepreneurial business talent. In recent research in career 
development, based on an survey of 1,847 Israeli working adults, Danziger et al. (2008) 
report that within Schein’s career anchor inventory, which is a set of questions aimed at 
identifying fundamental preferences regarding one’s career, the ”entrepreneurial 
creativity” dimension needs to be split into two factors: entrepreneurship and creativity. 
These results, along with our own findings, clearly demonstrate that more research is 
needed to improve the rather rudimentary measurement of creativity vis-à-vis other 
business-related talents. 
Our study of losses is limited by the fact that the participants could not actually 
lose money in the experiment due to the high show-up fee. Our design therefore 
potentially suffers from the aggregation effect, where participants net the show-up fee 
with the payoffs, rather than considering the show-up fee as a lump-sum windfall gain. 
Feedback from participants after the experiment, however, indicated that low payoffs 
were felt as losses from the initial endowment. We therefore believe that the endowment 
effect is more dominant than the aggregation effect. The aggregation effect is probably 15 
 
also mitigated by the fact that participants generally expect to earn about 10 Euros per 
hour and so earning a positive but lower amount is viewed as an opportunity loss. 
Despite randomizing participants from a wide range of disciplines, students with 
business-related majors might be correlated with specific personality traits and behavior. 
As a robustness check we therefore dummied all participants with majors in business, 
management, or economics (12 in Utrecht; 9 in Jena). Unreported regression analyses 
show that these participants do not behave differently from others. 
The higher internal validity of laboratory research is often seen as the price paid 
for lower external validity. To mitigate the latter, we took great care to include a set of 
diverse treatments that all are related to the dictator game, but incorporate very different 
characteristics. The fact that we find treatment effects in absolute levels of responses 
indicates that treatments do indeed make a difference. However, the fact that 
entrepreneurial talent behaves qualitatively similarly across all treatments makes us 
confident that the results generalize to other contexts as well. Note that our findings are 
especially significant for the games where the dictator can increase her chances of gain 
while at the same time increasing the receiver’s chance of a negative payoff. We believe 
that this version of the dictator game shows particular potential for further investigation 
in a wider context. 
4.3 Implications 
Entrepreneurial behavior is complex. Experiment-based investigation of it tends 
to focus on very specific aspects, e.g., risk taking in investment decisions or market entry 
decisions (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Elston et al., 2006). This study contributes to this 
body of research by investigating the other-regarding preferences of entrepreneurial 
talent. The treatments used in this paper that incorporate risk and negative externalities 
proved to be a suitable experimental design, especially for capturing central elements of 
entrepreneurial decision making that go beyond market entry and risk taking. 
We derive two main implications from our findings on other-regarding 
preferences of entrepreneurially talented people that may inform future research. First, 
entrepreneurial talent is at least two-dimensional with respect to its effects. Our results 
clearly show that business talent needs to be distinguished from creativity. Wilson et al. 
(2007) and Zhao et al. (2005), along with others in the empirical entrepreneurship 
literature, combine both dimensions. For some research questions, however, not 
disentangling these two dimensions of talent may produce misleading results. 
Second, and more importantly, our findings challenge existing theories on the 
allocation of entrepreneurial talent. We demonstrate that other-regarding behavior is 
correlated with entrepreneurial talent, more specifically, with certain structural 
components of talent, such that the allocation of entrepreneurial talent does not depend 16 
 
only on incentive systems and formal institutions, but also on social preferences. 
Allocation models need to take this into account. 
Our findings that creativity needs to be distinguished from business talent and that 
uncreative business talent is less other-regarding than creative business talent suggest an 
interesting path for theory development. We suggest that creativity is linked with value or 
rent creation, whereas business talent is linked with rent appropriation. While it is widely 
accepted that entrepreneurs need both (which is why measures of entrepreneurial self-
efficacy include both), people whose talent is differently focused might allocate into 
different types of opportunities. This may explain our finding that creative business talent 
is less maximizing with regard to own profits. Creative business talent may focus more 
on appropriating the rents they create themselves instead of considering rent seeking as 
an alternative. The less creative, however, may anticipate that they themselves will create 
less value and are thus inclined to rely more on appropriating rents from others. As a 
consequence, uncreative business talent could select relatively more into opportunities 
that maximize their profits while creative business talent balances rent seeking with rent 
creation. 
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Items for measuring entrepreneurial self-efficacy 
 
Items Source 
How do you compare yourself to fellow students in your 
ability to … 
 
a)  … solve problems?  Wilson et al. (2007) 
b)  … manage money?  Wilson et al. (2007) 
c)  … be creative?  Wilson et al. (2007) 
d)  … get people to agree with you?  Wilson et al. (2007) 
e)  … be a leader?  Wilson et al. (2007) 
f)  … make decisions?  Wilson et al. (2007) 
g)  … successfully identify new business opportunities?  Zhao et al. (2005) 
h)  … create new products?  Zhao et al. (2005) 
i)  … think creatively?  Zhao et al. (2005) 
j)  … commercialize an idea or new development?  Zhao et al. (2005) 
k)  … raise funds for a new business?  Monsen (pers. comm.) 
l)  … sell a new product or service?  Monsen (pers. comm.) 
The format follows the format by Wilson et al. (2007). Zhao et al. (2005) do not ask for a comparative 
judgment but for an absolute judgment of own ability. Since other studies revealed that comparative 








Name   Description 
T1 
Euro Gain  
You gain EUR 10 and the passive player gains EUR 0 (on top of your respective initial budgets). You 
can either leave earnings unchanged, or decrease your own, increasing the passive player’s earnings. If 
you decrease your own earnings, this increases the passive player’s earnings by the same amount. 
What amount do you want to deduct from your earnings and add to the earnings of the passive player? 
INTRO: 
T2–T6 
In this part there will be two lottery boxes. Each of the two boxes contains 100 lottery tickets. One box 
is yours (active player) and determines your earnings by drawing one ticket at random. The other box 
belongs to the passive player and determines his/her earnings in the same way. At the end of each 
decision round, exactly one lottery ticket will be randomly drawn out of each of the two boxes. 
There are three different kinds of lottery tickets that play a role in these five decision rounds: 
• GREEN tickets, if drawn, increase the earnings of the owner of the box by EUR 10. 
• RED tickets, if drawn, decrease the earnings of the owner of the box by EUR 10. 




You have 100 GREEN tickets (worth EUR 10) and the passive player has 100 WHITE tickets (worth 
EUR 0). You can exchange some or all of your GREEN tickets in your box with some or all of the 
WHITE tickets of the passive player’s box, or you can leave the distribution of tickets unchanged. For 
every GREEN ticket you exchange, you receive one WHITE ticket of the passive player. 




You have 100 RED tickets (worth EUR –10) and the passive player has 100 WHITE tickets (worth 
EUR 0). You can exchange some or all of your RED tickets in your box with some or all of the 
WHITE tickets of the passive player’s box, or you can leave the distribution of tickets unchanged. For 
every RED ticket you exchange, you receive one WHITE ticket of the passive player. 
How many RED tickets do you want to exchange for WHITE tickets of the passive player? 
INTRO: 
T4–T6 
In this part the 100 tickets in each of the two lottery boxes are WHITE (EUR 0). In each of the three 
treatments, you, the active player, will be asked to convert some of the tickets into another color. 
Which tickets you can convert in which of the boxes, how many tickets, and into which color, depends 
on the specific decision round. 
Each conversion from a WHITE into a GREEN ticket in your own box (active player) automatically 
converts one WHITE ticket into a RED ticket in the passive player’s box. Such a conversion therefore 




For every ticket converted from WHITE into GREEN (EUR 10 gain) in your box, a WHITE ticket 
(EUR 0) in the passive player’s box will automatically be converted into RED (EUR 10 loss). You can 
convert up to 100 WHITE tickets to GREEN tickets, but only in your box. 
How many WHITE tickets do you want to convert into GREEN tickets in your box, implying the same 




For every ticket converted from WHITE into GREEN (EUR 10 gain) in your box, a WHITE ticket 
(EUR 0) in the passive player’s box will automatically be converted into RED (EUR 10 loss). You can 
convert up to 100 WHITE tickets to GREEN tickets. Unused ticket conversions that you do not use to 
convert WHITE into GREEN in your box, are used to convert the RED tickets in the passive player’s 
box back into WHITE tickets.  
How many WHITE tickets do you want to convert into GREEN tickets in your box, implying the same 




For every ticket converted from WHITE into GREEN (EUR 10 gain) in your box, a WHITE ticket 
(EUR 0) in the passive player’s box will automatically be converted into RED (EUR 10 loss). You can 
convert up to 100 WHITE tickets to GREEN tickets. Those unused tickets that you do not use to 
convert WHITE into GREEN in your box, are used to convert the RED tickets in the passive player’s 
box back into WHITE tickets. If there are conversions left after converting passive player’s RED 
tickets into WHITE, these will be used to convert passive player’s WHITE tickets into GREEN. 
How many WHITE tickets do you want to convert into GREEN tickets in your box, implying the same 
number of WHITE tickets is converted into RED tickets in the passive player’s box? 
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TABLE 1 
Pearson correlations of psychometric variables and cumulative response (assumed 
to be metric) 
 
  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1  Creativity  1            
2  B u s i n e s s   t a l e n t   - . 0 1   1           
3  Social  dominance  -.11  .15  1         
4  Social responsibility  .27
* .15  -.25
+  1         
5  Extraversion  .28
* .33
* -.01 .49
*** 1        
6  Agreeableness  -.21  -.07  -.15  .10  .04  1      
7  Conscientiousness .14  .10  .07 .20 .10 .04 1       
8  Neuroticism -.01  -.28
* .24
+ -.01 -.17 -.15 .11  1     
9  Openness .65
***  -.14 -.07 .19  .29
* -.11 .13  -.08 1   
10 Cumulated response  -.25
* .22
+ .12  -.21 -.04 -.07 -.03 -.24
+ -.03  1 








Rank-based correlation coefficients for business talent and creativity with 
cumulated response and all treatment responses 
 
  Mean Std.  Median  Spearman’s  τ  Kendall’s tau 
     BT  C  BT  C 
CR  0.000 5.214 2.211 .23
+ -.24
+ .14  -.16
+ 





T  2  8.878 2.006 10  .24
+ -.11 .14
+ -.07 
T  3  8.578 2.099 10  .19  -.25
+ .11  -.16
+ 
T  4  7.245 3.377 9.5  .33
* -.17 .20
* -.11 
T  5  8.017 2.366 9.25  .23
+ -.18 .14  -.11 
T  6  7.723 2.843 9  .14  -.20  .08  -.13 
N = 60. Significance levels p < 0.10 (+), p < 0.05 (*), p < 0.01 (**), p < 0.005 (***). 
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TABLE 3 
Nonparametric tests whether business-talented uncreative participants stand out 
from the rest of the population with respect to their decisions 
 
   CR   T1   T2   T3   T4   T5   T6 
Mann-Withney tests (z value)         





























*** -1.34  -1.65
+ 
Kruskal-Wallis test (χ²)         
 Rest equal  .373   .109  .478 .603 .233 .776 .445 
 All equal  9.65






Add. Mann-Withney tests (z value)              
 BT–/C+ vs. BT–/C–  -.305 -.273 -.617 -.022 -.227 -.689 -.167 
 BT–/C+ vs. BT+/C–  -.565 -.305 -.592 -.679 .100  -.832 -.698 







Ordered probit regression analysis for business talent and creativity on egoism and 
a nonparametric test for uncreative business-talented people for all treatments and 
the average response 
 
   CR   T1   T2   T3   T4   T5   T6 
Age  -.078 (.144)  -.086 (.171)  -.213 (.169)  -.103 (.194)  -.084 (.177)   .076 (.140)   .034 (.152) 
Gender  -.109 (.165)  -.166 (.161)   .015 (.182)  -.053 (.177)   .022 (.169)  -.227 (.160)  -.105 (.163) 
Jena   .297 (.137)
*   .303 (.178)
+   .251 (.151)
+   .443 (.174)
*   .275 (.160)
+   .280 (.143)
+   .198 (.140) 
BT   .224 (.125)
+   .258 (.209)   .307 (.156)
*   .351 (.161)
*   .532 (.151)
***  .233 (.126)
+   .087 (.131) 
C  -.390 (.162)
* -.533  (.213)
*  -.175 (.183)  -.686 (.256)
** -.439 (.169)
* -.343  (.158)
* -.399  (.186)
* 
BT x C  -.387 (.168)
* -.463  (.200)




+ -.421  (.216)
+ 
Pseudo R²   .0496   .1008   .0733  .1320   .0991   .0626   .0580 
Significance levels p < 0.10 (+), p < 0.05 (*), p < 0.01 (**), p < 0.005 (***) Note: robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses are corrected for simultaneous unrelated estimation of models for dependent variables T1 to T6 
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TABLE 5 
Ordered probit regression analysis for business talent and creativity on egoism and 
nonparametric test for uncreative business-talented people for all treatments and 
the average response 
 
Cum. Resp.  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
Age  -.10 (.15)  -.08 (.14)  -.06 (.14)  -.07 (.14)  -.07 (.15)  -.09 (.15)  -.04 (.15)  -.13 (.15) 
Gender  -.08 (.17)  -.11 (.17)  -.09 (.16)  -.01 (.17)  .04 (.18)  .11 (.18)  -.06 (.17)  .17 (.17) 
Jena  .29 (.14)
* .30  (.14)
* .30  (.14)
* .35  (.14)
* .41  (.16)
* .43  (.17)
* .32  (.15)
* .44  (.19)
* 
SocDom      .13 (.20)  -.08 (.20)  .17 (.19)  .22 (.19)  .03 (.19)  .30 (.19) 
SocRes     -.32  (.15)
* -.31  (.15)
* -.33  (.16)
* -.31  (.15)
* -.36  (.17)
* 
Extraversion          -.08 (.15)  -.02 (.15)  -.06 (.16)  -.07 (.16) 
Agreeableness          -.10 (.19)  -.09 (.20)  -.05 (.17)  .02 (.21) 
Conscientiousness          .12 (.15)  .14 (.14)  .04 (.15)  .16 (.13) 
Neurotiscism       -.47  (.23)
* -.51  (.24)
*   -.57  (.22)
** 
Openness       .36  (.20)
+   .44  (.20)
* -.03  (.13) 
BT  .24 (.12)
* .22  (.13)
+ .22  (.12)
+ .29  (.13)
*  .23 (.17)  .15 (.16)  .27 (.15)
+  
C  -.35 (.17)
* -.39 (.16)
* -.39  (.16)
* -.33 (.16)
* -.60  (.21)
** -.36 (.16)
* -.26  (.21)   
BT x C   -.39  (.17)
* -.37  (.16)
* -.37 (.18)
* -.37  (.17)
* -.37  (.18)
* -.36  (.18)
*  
Pseudo R²  .0325  .0496  .0515  .0617 .0941 .0854 .0758  .0571 
Note:   Significance levels p < 0.10 (+), p < 0.05 (*), p < 0.01 (**), p < 0.005 (***). 

















































































Interaction of Business Talent and Creativity for All Treatments 
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